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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW*
VOLUME 38 SUMMER 1963 NUMBER 2
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1962
Presented below is the tenth annual Survey of Washington Case
Law. The articles in this survey issue have been written by second-
year students as part of their program to attain status as nominees
to the Law Review. They were guided in their work by the Casenote
Survey Editor of the Review and by members of the law school faculty.
The case survey issue does not mention every Washington case de-
cided in 1962. Rather, it discusses only those cases which add signifi-
cantly to Washington law or which otherwise merit special attention.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Review of Administrative Action by Extraordinary Writ. In
State ex rel. Cosmopolis Consol. School Dist. No. 99 v. Bruno,' a school
district having no high school sought review of the procedure under
which its pro-rata contribution to the building program of a neighbor-
ing high school district had been determined. The supreme court held
that review by extraordinary writ was proper, and two aspects of its
decision merit attention because of their implications concerning re-
view of administrative action generally. First, although the district had
proceeded under a writ of certiorari, which is by statute restricted to
the review of "judicial" functions, the supreme court in deciding that
review was proper gave no consideration to whether the challenged
administrative action was judicial or non-judicial in nature.' Secondly,
reviewability was said to extend to allegedly arbitrary and capricious
159 Wn2d 366, 367 P2d 995 (1962).
2 RCW 7.16.040. "A writ of review shall be granted by any court . . when an
inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functio,"' .... ;" (Emphasis
added.)
S The appellant's brief is apparently devoted in its entirety to convincing the court
of the "judicial" nature of the participation determination within the meaning of RCW
7.16.040, and ignores the arguments which might be available in terms of a proper
allocation of functions between courts and administrative agencies. Brief for Appel-
lant, pp. 7-19.
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conduct by the officials, as well as to the legality of the procedure under
the controlling statute.4
Under the applicable statute,5 the responsibility for making a proper
allocation of building costs between school districts is placed in the
county committee.6 The determination is made after a public hearing,7
and is forwarded to the State Board of Education for approval8 prior
to its submission to the district voters.' If the original plan is unac-
ceptable to the Board of Education, it is returned to the county com-
mittee with "suggestions for revision."" The county committee then
holds new hearings, drafts a revised plan, and resubmits it to the Board
of Education." Thus, the responsibility for originating a participation
remains in the county committee, presumably so that the public hear-
ing provided at that level will have maximum influence on the result.
In the present case, the Board of Education disapproved the plan
first submitted, and allegedly conditioned the continuance of the build-
ing program upon the acquiescence of the county committee in a new
participation determined by the Board of Education itself. The county
committee accepted the plan as determined by the Board of Education,
thereby placing a greater burden upon the non-high school district
than had been placed upon it under the committee's original plan.
The proceedings were immediately arrested by the appellant's suit,
alleging arbitrary and capricious action and seeking to prevent sub-
mission to the district voters of the plan as illegally adopted.
The sole basis for the dismissal of the appellant's action in the lower
court was the unavailability of statutory certiorari to review a non-
judicial function." In reversing, however, the supreme court stated
that the judicial or non-judicial nature of the function was not con-
trolling on the question of reviewability.Y The court thus ignored the
4 RCW 28.56.005 - .170.
5 RCW 28.56.005 - .170.
6 RCW 28.56.010.
7 RCW 28.56.030.
8 RCW 28.56.040.
9 RCW 28.56.050. The voters of the district can reject the plan, but this will result
in the recalcitrant district being annexed to the high school district under RCW
28.56.060. For an unsuccessful challenge to the statute and the annexation proceeding,
see Goodnoe Hills School Dist. No. 24 v. Forry, 52 Wn.2d 868, 329 P.2d 1083 (1958).
10 RCW 28.56.040.
11 RCW 28.56.040.
1259 Wn.2d 366, 368, 367 P.2d 995, 996 (1962).
" 59 Wn.2d 366, 369, 367 P.2d 995, 997 (1962). The court also recognizes that the
failure of the legislature to provide specifically for review in RCW 28.56 did not
deprive the courts of jurisdiction. This seems clearly established. See Peck, The
Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Washington, 33 WASH. L. Ray.
55 (1958).
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definitional requirements of certiorari which both the parties and the
lower court had expected to be determinative of the case." Since
reviewability must be in the end a policy decision, based upon some
concept of a proper allocation of functions between the courts and the
administrative agencies, it seems difficult to improve upon the court's
approach to this issue.
Confusion as to the effect of an improper choice of writ persists,
however, largely due to the continuing practice of affirming dismissals
on definitional grounds when nonreviewability might better be ex-
plained on a policy basis. 5 Likewise, there exists a tendency to grant
review when desirable by simply finding a "judicial" function, and the
term is hardly confining. 6 Many cases maintain the appearance of a
definitional approach, only to avoid the result that would seem to fol-
low from its rigorous application. Thus, the statutory writ of cer-
tiorari'7 has been expanded to allow review of non-judicial action,
expressly recognizing that the word "judicial" could be deleted from
the statute if the issue concerned jurisdiction or statutory procedure. 8
There is also some indication that the common law writ of certiorari,
existing under the state constitution 9 independently of any statute,
can be used to review non-judicial determinations of the same limited
issues.2"
In response to this state of affairs, a few cases have expressed a
willingness to treat the extraordinary writs interchangeably, treating
the application as if made for the proper writ whenever the record has
shown the relator entitled to some extraordinary relief." Thus, the
recent case of Tuschoff v. Westover22 contains the statement that the
court has traditionally regarded substance rather than form, and has
14 For a comprehensive analysis of the requirements of extraordinary writs, -see
Larson, Administrative Determinations and the Extraordinary Writs in the State of
Washington, 20 WASH. L. REv. 22, 81 (1945).
is See Okanogan County School Dist. No. 400 v. Andrews, '58 Wn.2d 371, 363
P2d 129 (1961).
16 Apparently, nearly anything can amount to a "judicial function." For discussion
and unfavorable comment, see 3 DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW § 24.06, at 425 (1958).
17 RCW 7.16.040.
is State ex rel. KIlaas v. Shumway, 140 Wash. 43, 248 Pac. 76 (1926). See Wilsey
v. Cornwall, 40 Wash. 250, 82 Pac. 303 (1905) (dictum).
'9 WASH. CoNsr. art. IV, § 6.
20 See State ex reL. McCallum v. Superior Court, 72 Wash. 144, 129 Pac. 900
(1913).
21 State ex rel. Meehan v. Superior Court, 193 Wash. 249, 74 P.2d 1012 (1938)
State ex rel. Shallenberger v. Superior Court, 174 Wash. 627, 25 P2d 1041 (1933);
State ex rel. Resburg v. Superior Court, 168 Wash. 384, 12 P.2d 420 (1932) ; State
ex rel. Crockett v. Sutton, 159 Wash. 307, 293 Pac. 469 (1930).
22 160 Wash. Dec. 723, 375 P.2d 254 (1962), involving review of a decision in an
unlawful detainer proceeding.
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treated any application as proper, irrespective of the writ asked.
There the court considered as on certiorari a matter which had been
raised by prohibition. While such cases have normally involved writs
issued by the supreme court to the superior court, there seems no
reason why the doctrine should not be applied as generally as it is
stated.
The intentional avoidance in Bruno of any writ theory whatsoever,
notwithstanding the availability of loose definitions, may indicate a
growing impatience with the extraordinary writs. Other states have
shown a willingness to avoid such limitations,2 and at least one com-
mentator24 has recognized, and applauded, the possibility of a trend
in this direction. The Washington court has now indicated that it
can be persuaded to ignore the extraordinary writs by arguments
addressed directly to policy considerations.
But the court's decision was not confined to whether judicial review
must be sought by means of the technically proper extraordinary writ.
In addition the court had to decide whether judicial review was avail-
able, assuming that it was sought by a procedurally correct means.
With respect to this part of the case, the language of the court, if not
its decision, is somewhat questionable. It is generally thought that the
availability of review should turn in part on the comparative abilities
of courts and administrators to deal with the kind of decision sought
to be reviewed. " The decision to review the procedure by which the
participation was determined can be reconciled with this standard,
because statutory interpretation is an area where the court rightly feels
especially competent. 6 This watchdog activity on agency procedure
under controlling statutes may be questionable on policy grounds, 7 but
it seems to be the usual result in Washington. Less convincing is that
23 New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409, 143 N.E.2d 256 (1957).
24 3 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 427.
254 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 16, at § 30.09; Peck, supra note 13.
26 See Floe v. Cedergreen Frozen Pack Corp., 37 Wn.2d 886, 226 P.2d 871 (1951).
Here the legality of the Board of Education's action apparently turns upon the
meaning of the words "suggestions for revision" in RCW 28.56.040.
27 See Peck, Standing Requirements for Obtaining Review of Governmental Action
in Washington, 35 WASH. L. REV. 362, 370 (1960), noting the pervasive policy that
lets some wrongs go unremedied to encourage the efficiency of public officials and
to prevent harassment by suits; consider e.g., public officer tort immunity. Compare
the attitude taken in Bruno with the refusal of the court to review the constitutionality
of the legislative process found in the rule that it will not look behind an enrolled
bill to the method, procedure or manner in which the bill was passed. Morrow v.
Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935) ; State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Board,
140 Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996 (1926).
28 Allen v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1, 55 Wn.2d 226, 347 P.2d 539 (1959), granting
an injunction against a tax levy on the ground of no substantial compliance with
notice and hearing provisions of the statute. There, as in Bruno, the agency was not
[VOL. 38
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part of the holding which includes within the scope of review arbitrary
and capricious conduct in actually dividing the costs between the dis-
tricts, irrespective of the procedure employed.
The process of determining whether a given decision is arbitrary or
capricious is one of measurement against acceptable principles or
standards. The standards set down by the statute"9 are general and
non-exclusive, and further direct the county committee to consider
"any other factors found by the committee to have a bearing on the
preparation of an equitable plan."3 ° Under this provision, the partici-
pation plan was based upon relative assessed valuations and the ability
to issue bonds, ignoring the number of students from each district.
Such a choice must be a value judgment, a pure policy decision, and the
only question is whether it is to be made by the court or the adminis-
trative agency. The contrast between the limited judicial means of
gathering information and the day to day experience of expert admin-
istrative specialists evoked a strong dissent:
It is difficult for me to conceive just what duties the court intends to
impose upon itself in deciding whether the state board acted arbitrarily
.... [I] t would have to study all of the evidence which was before the
board when it made its determination, make an independent study of
the principles which ordinarily guide an administrative body of this
kind and which have proved most effective, and interview all of the
members ... in order to learn what their experience had taught them
about the problems .... 31
It seems doubtful that Bruno should be read to imply that the
allegation of arbitrary and capricious conduct will alone entitle a
party to judicial review. The traditional use of these terms has been
to limit the scope of judicial review, the courts deferring to agency
discretion where the circumstances of the case permit a number of
diverse conclusions." It has never been thought to relieve the plaintiff
of pleading facts sufficient to support a claim for relief. If the dissent-
ing opinion is correct in its complaint that the court is about to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency as to the proper factors to
consider in making the plan, Bruno may well be an unsound develop-
ment in Washington law. However, it seems preferable to view the
bound by the hearing results, but the court noted a legislative intent that through the
hearing the public have an opportunity to influence any decision.
21 RCW 28.56.020.
30 59 Wn2d 366, 373, 367 P2d 995, 1001 (1962).
31 Id. at 379, 367 P2d at 1005.32 Sweitzer v. Industrial Ins. Comm., 116 Wash. 398, 199 Pac. 724 (1921) (de-
fining "arbitrary and capricious").
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majority as agreeing to review only the procedure employed, assuring
that the plan is originated as the statute directs, in the agency for
which a hearing is provided.
The Petition alleged that the county committee was not privileged to
exercise its discretion... but was coerced by the State Board of Educa-
tion into adopting a participation suitable to it .... The legality of the
act of the officials is subject to review, as well as their alleged arbitrary
and capricious conduct. 33
If such an interpretation is justified, the problem is not that the
court has intervened where the judgment of the agency ought to be
preferred.34 Rather, the problem is that judicial intervention absent
an open and explicit evaluation of the comparative abilities of the
courts and the agency has made the policy basis of reviewability appear
broader than intended and, to that extent, unsound. 5
ADDENDUM
This case was reviewed on the merits in State ex rel. Cosmopolis
Consol. School Dist. No. 99 v. Bruno, 161 Wash. Dec. 459, 378 P.2d
691 (1963). "Arbitrary and capricious conduct" was found to be
negated by a showing that the Board of Education "gave consider-
ation" to all of the statutory factors, although its ultimate suggested
plan turned completely upon the relative assessed valuations of the two
districts. The only inquiry of substance was whether the Board of
Education had acted within its statutory authority in making "sug-
gestions for revision," which amounted to specifying a single acceptable
plan. It was held that it had so acted, and that when the county com-
mittee adopted the plan of the Board rather than delay construction,
it exercised its discretion in sufficient compliance with RCW 28.56.
CHARLES B. COOPER
33 59 Wn.2d 366, 369, 367 P.2d 995, 997 (1962).
34 Granting that the courts ought to intervene more freely in questions of statutory
interpretation, subject to the reservations expressed in note 26 supra.
35 Note that in granting review, the majority choose to by-pass solid issues of
standing and ripeness, important concepts in preventing the courts from being led
into a supervisory position over the legislative branch of government. Such is com-
mon when it is impracticable to wait for an actual injury (see note 9 supra) or when
a "public interest" is thought to be involved. See Malaga School Dist. No. 115 v.
Kinkade, 47 Wn.2d 516, 288 P.2d 467 (1955) (district had standing to challenge the
transfer of valuable taxable property to another district) ; Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wn.2d
767, 246 P.2d 489 (1952) (potential candidates for public office, standing to challenge
loyalty oath requirement).
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